The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a framework with two distinct types of agents on either side of the market, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly lower than the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, we find that it is possible in the monopoly optimum that the contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is contract-specific.
Introduction
Second-degree price discrimination is a well-known phenomenon in industrial organization. Non-linear pricing schemes are very common in the telecommunications industry, in insurance markets, or in railroad and airline industries. The problem of a monopolistic firm seeking to maximize profit by offering type-specific contracts that are voluntarily chosen by the appropriate type of consumer has been widely analysed in the economic literature. Seminal papers are Spence (1977) , Stiglitz (1977) , Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , or Spulber (1993) . More recently, second-degree price discrimination has also been discussed in the context of duopolistic competition, yielding ambiguous effects of price discrimination on profits. The most relevant paper dealing with this topic is Stole (1995) , whereas Armstrong (2006a) and Stole (2007) survey this literature.
That literature refers to the case of traditional one-sided markets, while many industries operate on two-sided markets, i.e. markets where platforms enable interaction between two distinct groups of agents. The economics of two-sided markets has been extensively analysed in the economic literature. While Tirole (2003, 2006) , Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , and Armstrong (2006b) analyse monopolistic and duopolistic price-setting behaviour in more general two-sided frameworks, Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) , Gabszewicz et al. (2004) , Anderson and Coate (2005) , and Peitz and Valletti (2008) specifically focus on media markets.
We observe that second-degree price discrimination is also present on twosided markets, since offering type-specific contracts for different types of agents is very common in two-sided industries. For instance, movie theatres offer multiticket contracts or even flat-rates, pay-TV platforms sell different combinations of content and price, while online dating platforms allow men to subscribe for, e.g. 1 month, 6 months, or 1 year with a decreasing price per month. In addition, second-degree price discrimination became particularly relevant in the newspaper industry when many newspaper companies started to additionally offer their content on the internet. Here, different strategies can be observed. While some companies simply offer identical content via pay-per-view access, others publish reduced content, e.g. shortened articles or original articles with a significant time delay, without charging any price, but exposing readers to advertising. Compared to the traditional printed newspaper, this may well be interpreted as a different contract that contains quality-reduced content for a lower price. Surprisingly, it can also be observed that some newspapers, e.g. Germany's best-selling newspaper "Bild," regularly publish exclusive print media content (e.g. exclusive stories or soccer trade rumors) without any quality reduction on the internet free of charge, generating revenues from advertising only.
In the literature, so far, rather little attention has been given to non-linear pricing strategies on two-sided markets. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Armstrong (2006b) , and Weyl (2010) analyse the case of group-specific prices, i.e. thirddegree price discrimination, whereas two-part tariffs are considered by Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Armstrong (2006b) , and Reisinger (2014) . In addition, Liu and Serfes (2013) study first-degree price discrimination on a two-sided duopolistic market, while Csorba and Hahn (2006) , Csorba (2008) , and Board (2009) model monopolistic screening on one-sided markets with intra-group network externalities. Recently, economic literature started to study second-degree price discrimination in the context of two-sided networks: coming most closely to our paper, Gomes and Pavan (2016) analyse second-degree price discrimination in "manyto-many matching markets." However, in their framework the (type-dependent) agents' utility exclusively depends on the interaction with agents from the opposite market side, whereas our setup will additionally account for (heterogeneous) intrinsic benefits from joining the platform. In addition, our setup differs from Gomes and Pavan (2016) by allowing the monopolist to directly sell different amounts of platform access to the agents, while their model focuses on the optimal matching design for the two market sides. Another closely-related contribution is Veiga and Weyl (2016) , who develop a very broad approach to analyse product differentiation under multidimensional heterogeneity of agents. Their analysis allows for intrinsic benefits, but touches the case of two-sided markets only briefly. In particular, they do not compare their solution to the (benchmark) case of complete information, which will be the focus of our paper. Hence, we contribute to the literature by analysing second-degree price discrimination on monopolistic two-sided markets in more detail, even though our framework is admittedly much less general than the ones provided in Gomes and Pavan (2016) and Veiga and Weyl (2016) . Finally, Angelucci et al. (2013) develop a theoretical model to study second-degree price discrimination in the newspaper industry. However, in their model readers are assumed to be ad-neutral, i.e. they are not affected from advertising. While this may certainly be a reasonable assumption for the newspaper industry, it makes the model less applicable to two-sided markets in general. In our setup we allow for all kinds of network externalities on either side of the market.
Inspired by the examples mentioned above, we develop a simple two-sided framework, where we assume both market sides to consist of two distinct types of agents with different valuations regarding the intrinsic utility they obtain from joining the platform. We suppose that the total number of agents on either side of the market is fixed, but the agents' access to the platform is variable. As per usual, the agents' utility is additionally affected from indirect network externalities. Here, we also suppose type-dependent valuations regarding these "network benefits."
We show that many of the well-known results from second-degree price discrimination on one-sided markets still prevail in a two-sided framework. However, in contrast to the "no-distortion-at-the-top" result from one-sided markets, we find that due to the two-sidedness of the market, the profit-maximizing quantity for high-demand agents is strictly rationed. The reason for this is that the participation of agents from one market side exerts an externality that affects low-demand as well as high-demand agents on the opposite market side and hence their designated contracts. However, incentive compatibility requires that high-demand agents on the opposite market side must be indifferent between these two contracts. This prevents the monopolist from completely exploiting the externality, because the high-demand agents' willingness to pay cannot be fully extracted. In addition, our findings indicate that if the interaction with agents from the opposite market side depends on the chosen contract, it is possible that in case of a negative network effect the optional contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents. The intuition for this is that high-demand agents get more platform access and are hence exposed to a higher disutility from the interaction with the opposite market side. Therefore, they must be compensated by a lower payment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the analytical framework, whereas Section 3 analyses the price setting behaviour of a monopolistic platform operator. In this context, we discuss the benchmark case of complete information and compare our results to the case of incomplete information. Section 4 follows the same structure, but imposes contract-specific interaction, i.e. the extent of interaction depends on the chosen contract. Section 5 summarizes the findings and the contribution of the paper and suggests directions for further research.
Analytical Framework
This section develops a benchmark model of a monopolistic platform operator on a two-sided market. The theoretical framework considers two market sides i = 1, 2, where both market sides consist of two distinct groups of agents k = L, H. The total number of individuals on either side of the market is exogenously given and the total market size on each side is supposed to be equal to 1. Agents of both groups differ in their intrinsic valuation for joining the platform as well as in their valuation of network effects. The share of low-demand agents on market side i is denoted by 0 < μ i < 1, which is common knowledge. While the agents know their individual type, the platform operator is not able to distinguish agents with respect to their type. Hence, except for the benchmark case, this situation is characterized by asymmetric information.
We assume that market side i's agents' utility consists of two elements: an intrinsic utility that depends on each agent's access to the platform, denoted by q i ∈ ℝ + , as well as an indirect network effect from the interaction with market side j's agents and the total payment t i ∈ ℝ + . The corresponding utility function is additive separable and can be described by ( , , ) ( ) , 1, 2, , , ,
where u i (.) represents the utility from joining the platform, α > implies an additional benefit for agents on market side i from interacting with agents from the opposite market side. In addition, we assume
which ensures that the high demand agents' willingness to pay exceeds the one of lowdemand agents for any combination of (q i , Q j ) and for any sign of .
k i α To avoid corner solutions, we suppose that network externalities are sufficiently small.
Note that we assume that agents on market side i do not care about the total number of agents from market side j, but about the (average) extent of their access to the platform. This implies that a potential benefit from interaction is assumed to depend on the extent of the interaction process.
1 The interpretation of platform access depends on the technology of the platform under consideration: for instance, in case of a movie theatre, q i simply measures the number of tickets that are included in a specific contract. In case of online media platforms, however, q i may refer to the number of articles or videos that can be accessed under a particular contract. Considering advertisers, q i could be intepreted as the number of spots or banner ads that an advertiser is allowed to place on the platform.
Throughout the paper, we focus on interior solutions, i.e. we focus on those solutions where both types of agents on market side i are served in the optimum. This requires that we have to assume that the two types are not too different. Since there is no within-group heterogeneity on market side i, focusing on interior solutions implies that all agents from this market side will join the platform in the monopoly optimum. Hence, we do not analyse cases where the monopolist voluntarily excludes some agents. This provides some intuition for assuming that the network effect on market side i only depends on Q j and not on the number of market side j agents. We normalize reservation utility of market side i agents to U ̅ i = 0. The cost function of the monopolistic platform operator is assumed to consist of constant marginal cost, c i , for each unit of access to market side i. The resulting cost function is given by
The theoretical framework refers to the extent of platform access that is sold to agents on either side of the market, which may well be interpreted as being equivalent to selling different quantities of a consumption good to different types of consumers. This allows for a comparison of our results to the well-known second-degree price discrimination outcome from traditional one-sided markets.
Our model setup differs to the existing literature in several dimensions: most of the well-known two-sided market models [e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003)] assume type-dependent valuations with respect to the benefit from interacting with agents from the opposite market side (while mostly ignoring "participation benefits"). In contrast, we additionally allow for heterogeneous preferences with respect to intrinsic benefits. This specific structure may not be relevant for traditional two-sided industries (e.g. credit cards, online dating platforms etc.). Instead, it reflects the characteristics of platform industries that directly offer services to consumers, but additionally enable interaction with agents from a second market side. The most intuitive examples are media markets and (heterosexual) nightclubs. For instance, consider a movie theatre: while cinemagoers usually have different valuations with respect to watching a movie, they are also heterogenously affected from the presence of advertising. The same holds for nightclubs and bars, where agents on both market sides may heterogenously benefit from participation (e.g. from listening to music or having a drink), while they additionally derive (type-dependent) utility from interacting with potential partners.
Model Analysis

The Benchmark Case of Complete Information
Under complete information, the monopolist maximizes profits by selling a typespecific contract of platform access and payment to each type of agents on either side of the market. We can show that all participation constraints are binding in the optimum. With binding participation constraints the maximization problem can be described by
with the first-order conditions
Respecting the assumptions specified in Section 2, Equations (2) and (3) implicitly define the profit-maximizing solution ( , ), 1, 2.
i * * = As per usual, the monopolist's profit is maximized where marginal profit is equal to zero. However, it is not surprising to see that our results are more complex than in the traditional case of one-sided markets as the marginal profit also accounts for the arising network externalities on the opposite market side j. In particular, we find that for 0 ( 0),
q generates additional revenue (cost), because market side j's agents' utility increases (decreases) due to the network effects. Comparing Equations (2) and (3), while taking into account that
it is easy to verify that we have ,
which is in line with the corresponding result from one-sided markets. In addition, we can show that .
The Case of Incomplete Information
In case of asymmetric information, the monopolistic platform operator is not able to distinguish the agents' individual types. Hence, each type of agents must voluntarily choose its designated contract (incentive constraints). With incentive (IC) and participation constraints (PC) the corresponding optimization problem is given by 2 , , , 1
s.t. 
This implies that PC
where m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. We take the derivatives with respect to L i t and ,
In a first step, we now solve for the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Our results are summarized in Lemma 1. (10) to (13), we find that λ 1 = 1, λ 2 = 0, λ 3 =(1 − μ 1 ), λ 4 = 1, λ 5 = 0, and λ 6 =(1 − μ 2 ).
Lemma 1: Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as well as Equations
Proof: See Appendix
Given the results from Lemma 1, the remaining first-order conditions become
Taking (16) into account, we can conclude from comparing Equations (14) and (15) Obviously, under incomplete information we still find that the contract for high-demand agents contains more platform access and a higher payment compared to the contract for low-demand agents. In addition, we can conclude from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the L-type's consumer surplus in the optimium is zero, while the H-type enjoys a strictly positive consumer surplus. Since H i IC is binding in the optimum, we know that high-demand agents are indifferent between the two contracts. The results obtained so far are entirely consistent with the corresponding findings on one-sided markets.
Comparing the Outcomes
The final step in analyzing the model is to compare the results under incomplete information to the benchmark case of complete information. On one-sided markets this comparison produces the well-known "no-distortion-at-the-top" rule, i.e. one finds that in case of asymmetric information, the contract for low-demand consumers contains less quantity than under complete information, while high-demand consumers are provided the efficient quantity. The corresponding findings of our two-sided market model are summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: Under incomplete information, the profit-maximizing amount of platform access for L-type agents on market side i, , L i q * * is strictly smaller than under complete information. Unlike on a one-sided market, the optimal level of platform access for market side i's H-type agents, , H i q * * is strictly below the benchmark level, independent of the sign of the network externality exerted on market side j agents.
Proof: See Appendix
The economic intuition behind our findings is as follows: the monopolistic platform operator is maximizing her profit by inducing a self-selection process among both types of agents on market side i. Therefore, the contract that is sold to low-demand agents ceteris paribus contains less platform access than under complete information as this allows the platform operator to extract additional consumer surplus from high-demand agents on market side i. This result is well-known from second-degree price discrimination on one-sided markets.
However, on a two-sided market any marginal increase in , 1, 2, , , 
q Q q which represents the changes in market side j's agents' overall willingness to pay. Taking the shares of low-and highdemand agents into account, while respecting that /
∂ cancels out in the FOCs, we find that the monopolist's overall marginal revenue from network effects on market side j is represented by (1 ) is still binding, we know that incentive compatibility for j's high-demand agents requires that IC H j binds at the optimum. Therefore, a marginal change in
t by the same amount. In contrast, there is no direct impact on IC , H j because network effects are identical in the two contracts and hence not relevant for incentive compatibility. However, since
< becomes more (less) expensive and hence less (more) attractive for high-demand agents. This allows (forces) the monopolist to increase (decrease)
Respecting the distribution of agents on market side j, we find that the overall marginal impact on the monopolist's revenue is represented by
(1 ) (14) We can use the outcome of the second-degree price discrimination problem on one-sided markets as an alternative benchmark for a comparison with our results under incomplete information. The case of one-sided markets is equivalent to the special case of our model where 0.
k i α = In this special case, Equations (14) and (15) 
This reproduces the "no-distortion-at-the-top" outcome from one-sided markets. We denote this specific solution by ˆ( , ), 1, 2.
i = If we consider the case of 0, k j α > we find by using (14) and (15) that 
A Model with Contract-Specific Interaction
So far, we have assumed that both types of agents on market side i are equivalently affected by the presence of market side j agents. In this section, we extend the analysis by including contract-specific interaction, i.e. the extent of the indirect externality depends on the chosen contract. We account for this by imposing a different utility function for agents on market side i. This utility function is supposed to take the form
while the notation and the assumptions introduced in Section 2 remain the same.
The motivation behind this model specification stems from the movie theatre example mentioned in Section 1. Suppose that a cinema operator offers two contracts: the L-type contract contains a single ticket for a specific price, while the H-type contract includes five tickets for a total payment that implies a per ticket price below the price of the single ticket. If both types of consumers buy their designated contracts, the L-type is only once exposed to the cinema-specific amount of advertising, while the H-type watches the same amount of advertising five times.
Profit Maximization under Complete Information
In case of symmetric information, the monopolistic platform operator is again able to perfectly discriminate between both types of agents on market side i by selling type-specific contracts as take-it-or-leave-it offers. Respecting that the participation constraints must be binding in the optimum, the monopolist's optimization problem is given by 2 , ,
(
yielding the (simplified) first-order conditions
i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j. Equations (18) and (19) implicitly characterize the optimal solution, which we denote by ( , ), 1, 2.
i * * = Given our extension of contract-specific interaction, it is not surprising to see that the effects resulting from network externalities are more complex than in the benchmark case of Section 3. Analyzing Equations (18) and (19) reveals that the first-order conditions reflect three different effects (apart from the traditional impact on the willingness to pay for participation): first, a marginal change of k i q directly affects the willingness to pay of market side i agents, because their extent of interaction with market side j agents changes. This is represented by .
In addition, any change in
q influences the utility of low-demand and high-demand agents on market side j and hence their willingness to pay. After some algebraic simplifications, these two (indirect) marginal effects are reflected by the terms , This corresponds to our findings from the previous section. Using the binding participation constraints, the profit-maximizing payments for the typespecific contracts are given by
Hence, the difference of payments is described by
So far, our results are not surprising as they are consistent with the results from Section 3. However, analysing the relation of the contract-specific payments yields an interesting result, which we summarize in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Under complete information, the profit-maxmizing payment for the H-type contract on market side i strictly exceeds the optimal price-level for the L-type contract if the indirect network externality exerted on market side i agents is positive or absent, i.e. if 0. α < it is possible that in a profitmaximizing solution the contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents, even though the latter contains a strictly higher extent of platform access. This result requires that 0.
The results of Proposition 2 are surprising, since they contradict the standard result from one-sided markets where the monopolist in any case charges a higher tariff for the high-demand contract. However, in case of contract-specific interaction on a two-sided market, the optimization problem is more complex: considering the case of occurs if market side j agents' willingness to pay is rather high. These two conditions are related via the network effects on market side j: if these network effects are very strong, the monopolist offers a large extent of platform access to market side i's high-demand agents, which strongly increases market side j's agents' willingness to pay. Hence, their incentives to join the platform increase, which results in a large Q j . In order to determine if / | 0
is feasible in the optimum, we have to recall the first-order conditions. Here, we can show by using (19) that / | 0
This condition perfectly reflects our intuition from above as it holds if the network effect exerted on market side j is relatively strong compared to the marginal cost c i . For 0,
reflects the marginal revenue that arises from the indirect impact of an increase in H i q on market side j's agents' willingness to pay. In case that this expression is very large, we know that an additional unit q reduces the utility of market side i agents, but their participation is crucial in order to exploit the high marginal revenues from market side j. Therefore, the platform operator has to compensate both types of agents for their utility losses by reducing the contract-specific payment. As we have found that ,
we know that high-demand agents on market side i are facing a larger extent of utility reduction in the optimum, since the interaction with market side j agents is assumed to depend on the chosen contract. Hence, in order to respect the participation constraints, the price reduction for the H-type contract will exceed the one for the L-type contract. In case that
(1 ) 0 
− > is satisfied, the platform operator has to compensate high-demand agents by choosing .
Optimization under Incomplete Information
The monopolist has to respect incentive and participation constraints when maximizing her profit under incomplete information. Hence, we can describe the optimization problem by 2 , , , 1
s.t. 5  2 2  2  2  2 2  2  2  2 1  2  2   6  2 2  2  2  2 2  2  2  2 1  2 t correspond to Equations (10) to (13) from Section 3. Therefore, we can analogously show that a profit-maximizing solution requires λ 1 = 1, λ 2 = 0, λ 3 =(1 − μ 1 ), λ 4 = 1, λ 5 = 0, and λ 6 =(1 − μ 2 ). Hence, we can write the remaining first-order conditions as
where
Equations (27) and (28) implicitly determine the optimal solution, which we label 1 1 ( ,
.
we find by comparing (27) and (28) that ,
* * * * > which implies that the optimal level of platform access for highdemand agents on market side i still exceeds the one for low-demand agents. From the Kuhn-Tucker constraints we can conclude that there is still no consumer surplus for the L-type, while the H-type is indifferent between both contracts and enjoys a strictly positive consumer surplus. These results are consistent with our findings from the previous section. As we know that PC L i as well as IC H i are binding in the optimum, we find that the optimal payments are given by
Hence, the price difference is expressed by
In the benchmark case of complete information we found that under specific parameter constellations the L-type contract was more expensive than the H-type contract. However, in case of asymmetric information, the monopolistic platform operator is not able to sell type-specific take-it-or-leave-it offers to agents on market side i, which potentially influences our results. We summarize the corresponding findings under incomplete information in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3: In case of asymmetric information, it holds in the optimum that the profit-maximizing tariff for the H-type contract on market side i is strictly larger than the payment for the L-type contract if the presence of market side j agents exerts a nonnegative externality on both types of agents on market side i, i.e. for 0.
α < the results are ambiguous, which implies that the price level of the L-type contract may exceed the payment for the H-type contract.
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 3 shows that our results from the benchmark case of complete information prevail under incomplete information: it is still possible that the optimal L-type contract is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents. This is not surprising as we know that the H-type enjoys a strictly positive consumer surplus under incomplete information, while the monopolist extracts the entire consumer surplus in case of perfect price discrimination. Hence, in order to make high-demand agents better off than under complete information, the monopolistic platform operator ceteris paribus has an incentive to increase the H-type's utility in the optimum by choosing H i t * * below the level of the benchmark case. Therefore, as we already know that 0
− < is feasible under complete information, it is not surprising that this outcome prevails under incomplete information. In order to precisely determine the parameter constellations for which 0
− < holds, we have to impose a specific functional form for u i (q i ).
For instance, let For instance, this would be relevant in the movie theatre example where additional tickets do not have to be used. Hence, our results are only valid if the platform technology makes free disposal impossible. This is, for instance, most likely the case for online media platforms where the contract-specific amount of advertising does not necessarily have to be presented on an per-article or per-video basis. Instead, advertising can be entirely presented before the agents get access to the platform's content (i.e. consumers have to watch several commercials before they are allowed to read an article). Hence, low-demand agents would be exposed to the H-type contract's amount of the negative externality before they have the chance to dispose additional units of platform access. Therefore, they would prefer to buy their designated contract.
Comparison with the Benchmark Case
We close the analysis by comparing our findings from the case of asymmetric information to the benchmark case of complete information. Proposition 4 contains the corresponding results.
Proposition 4:
In case of contract-specific interaction, the low-demand agents' extent of platform access under incomplete information is strictly smaller than the benchmark level, i.e. it holds that .
In addition, the profit-maximizing amount of platform access for high-demand agents is also negatively affected under incomplete information. Hence, we find that . produces the well-known distortive effect on the optimal extent of platform access for market side i's low-demand agents. This is represented by (1 < in (27) . In addition, the monopolist is not able to fully exploit the externality exerted by . (27) and (28), which reflects two different effects: first, any marginal increase in
< makes the low-demand contract more (less) expensive and hence less (more) attractive for market side j's high-demand agents. At the same time, the L-type contract becomes more (less) attractive, because it provides / L H k j j i i q Q q α ∂ ∂ more (less) utility for high-demand agents when mimicking the L-type. Respecting the share of high-demand agents and that both effects have opposite directions, we find that the (simplified) net effect is (1 ) ( ) 0,
This paper provides a positive analysis of second-degree price discrimination on a monopolistic two-sided market. We found that many of the results from the equivalent problem on one-sided markets are still valid in our two-sided setting: the extent of platform access (which may well be interpreted as quality) for low-demand agents is strictly reduced under incomplete information, in order to induce the well-known self-selection process among agents on market side i, while allowing the monopolist to extract additional consumer surplus from high-demand agents. In addition, in the optimum agents with low valuation are still left without any consumer surplus, whereas high-demand agents are in any case indifferent between the two contracts, while enjoying an information rent.
However, we reveal some important differences in relation to the seconddegree price discrimination problem on one-sided markets: in Section 3, we found that the "no-distortion-at-the-top" rule from one-sided markets does not prevail in our two-sided framework. Our analysis yielded that ,
e. under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly below the level under complete information. In the subsequent analysis of Section 4 we also showed that this outcome is robust with respect to the model specification of contract-specific interaction. This result implies that the monopolistic optimization problem is more complex in the presence of network externalities as there are two different distortive effects at work on market side i: first, the traditional downward distortion resulting from incentive compatibility of market side i's high-demand agents. As per usual, this only affects .
L i
q Secondly, incentive compatibility of market side j's high-demand agents prevents the monopolist from fully exploiting the network effects that each unit of q less profitable for the monopolist, hence downwardly distorting their levels in the optimum. The analysis of Section 4 implied another important result: in case of contract-specific interaction, it may be profit-maximizing that the low-demand contract is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents, which contradicts the findings from one-sided markets. This surprising result holds for the case of complete information and prevails under incomplete information.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the focus of our analysis is exclusively positive. We do not draw any normative conclusions with respect to the welfare aspects of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a two-sided market. Extending the analysis by welfare considerations remains the task for further research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
The proof can be divided into two steps. At first, we show that λ 1 = 1, λ 2 = 0, and λ 3 =(1 − μ 1 ). Here, we know that the relevant Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by 
Respecting these conditions, we are now checking for potential solutions. First, suppose that λ 1 = 0 and solve (11) for λ 3 , which yields λ 3 =(1 − μ 1 ) + λ 2 . Then, we find that (10) becomes μ 1 − λ 2 +(1 − μ 1 ) + λ 2 = 0 ⇔ 1 = 0, which produces a contradiction. Hence, we must have λ 1 > 0. Now suppose that λ 3 = 0. In this case, (11) becomes (1 − μ 1 ) + λ 2 = 0, which also yields a contradiction, because λ 2 ≥ 0 and 1 − μ 1 > 0. Therefore, it must be that λ 3 > 0. Finally, suppose that λ 1 > 0, λ 2 > 0, and 
= which is not a profit-maximizing solution. Hence, we must have that λ 2 = 0, which easily yields λ 1 = 1 and λ 3 =(1 − μ 1 ).
Showing that λ 4 = 1, λ 5 = 0 as well as λ 6 =(1 − μ 2 ) follows the same approach.
Proof of Proposition 1:
In a first step, we can show that
Then, we use (16) and (30) and compare Equations (2) and (14) − where ε > 0 is assumed to be very small. In this case, it approximately holds that Since an optimal solution requires ( ) , 
